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Original Research Article
The (Big) Data-security assemblage:
Knowledge and critique
Claudia Aradau1 and Tobias Blanke2
Abstract
The Snowden revelations and the emergence of ‘Big Data’ have rekindled questions about how security practices are
deployed in a digital age and with what political effects. While critical scholars have drawn attention to the social, political
and legal challenges to these practices, the debates in computer and information science have received less analytical
attention. This paper proposes to take seriously the critical knowledge developed in information and computer science
and reinterpret their debates to develop a critical intervention into the public controversies concerning data-driven
security and digital surveillance. The paper offers a two-pronged contribution: on the one hand, we challenge the
credibility of security professionals’ discourses in light of the knowledge that they supposedly mobilize; on the other,
we argue for a series of conceptual moves around data, human–computer relations, and algorithms to address some of
the limitations of existing engagements with the Big Data-security assemblage.
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Introduction
In the wake of the Snowden revelations, the question of
how data is used for security purposes has re-emerged
as a political problem. Critical inquiries around data
and security are not new: from the production of trace-
ability (e.g. Bonditti, 2008), proactive and pre-emptive
management through data analytics (Aradau and van
Munster 2011; Bigo, 2008; de Goede, 2012), database
management, algorithmic governance or dataveillance
in the ‘war on terror’ (Amoore and de Goede, 2005;
Raley, 2013), the literature on security practices has
analysed the multiple facets of the social and political
transformations that the proliferation and increased
use of data have entailed. The Snowden revelations
and the emergence of ‘Big Data’ have rekindled these
debates and prompted new inquiries into how digital
practices and Big Data devices are deployed for the
purposes of security and with what political eﬀects.
These transformations have so far been analysed as
part of the ‘computational turn’ in security governance,
with data mining, predictive analytics and algorithmic
decision-making playing an important role in the digital
transformation of security (Amoore, 2011; Rouvroy,
2012). Big Data is an indicator of the transformations
that digital information has brought about by being
‘too big to know’ (Weinberger, 2011). These dynamics
have far-reaching implications for privacy and data
protection, alongside civil liberties and human rights,
which appear to be most at stake (Bauman et al., 2014;
Lyon, 2014; Pasquale, 2015).1 Therefore, critical scho-
lars have concentrated mostly on social, political and
legal challenges to Big Data and have paid less atten-
tion to the controversies around concepts and devices
in computer and information science. The debates
about the transformations that are underway have
often tended to embrace particular dominant represen-
tations of this perceived computational or, more
recently, Big Data ‘revolution’ rather than attending
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to the contestations and controversies about computing
and digital knowledge formulated in these disciplines.
This paper investigates how the supposed ‘novelty’
implied by a digital transformation of security practices
has been particularly put to use by security and intelli-
gence experts in order to justify an urgent need for
novel responses to anticipate and pre-empt the ‘next
terrorist attack’. For security professionals, Big Data,
in particular, stands for the promise of solutions to
contemporary security problems. Here, they are not
so diﬀerent from other institutional actors and strate-
gies, from the development of e-science to new forms of
e-government or a renewed focus in commercial organ-
izations on their data assets. Critical scholars have simi-
larly embraced this discourse of novelty in which Big
Data is a ‘game changer’ (Hildebrandt, 2013: 8). We
contend that these assumptions of novelty of a Big
Data ‘revolution’ and game change in science – and
by extension in governance practices – limit the poten-
tial of critical engagement. In analysing an emerging
Big Data-security assemblage which brings together
heterogeneous modes of knowledge, devices, institu-
tions and methods, we address the impasses of critical
discourses as formulated by civil liberties activists as
well as critical scholars of security and Big Data.
Although the methods used by intelligence agencies
like the National Security Agency (NSA) and
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)
are secret, we start from the assumption that it is
unlikely that their methods would be widely diﬀerent
from the state of the art in computing and informa-
tion science, and the practices developed in dealing
with Big Data in academic organizations and commer-
cial institutions. In this sense, the paper understands
intelligence agencies as Big Data organizations that
employ data-driven methods to anticipate future dan-
gers. A collaboration between social and computer
scientists, as this paper proposes, can help go
beyond the inscrutability of algorithmic methods in
security practices.
In so doing, this paper develops a contribution to
critical data studies (Kitchin, 2014) and critical
approaches to security and surveillance (Amoore,
2014; Bauman et al., 2014; Lyon, 2014). We propose
to take seriously the critical knowledge developed in
information and computer science and reinterpret
these debates to oﬀer a critique of the common repre-
sentations by security professionals of the digital trans-
formation of their practices. The paper makes three
moves that recast existing critical engagements with
data-driven security: from data/metadata distinctions
to the production of data as a complex epistemic
entity; from a ‘computational turn’ in surveillance to
the division of labour between humans and computers
in socio-technical assemblages; from an underlying
logic of algorithms to algorithmic practices and meth-
ods in security analytics.
These moves are developed through the analysis of
three sites of public controversy about NSA and
GCHQ surveillance and the use of Big Data for security
governance in the wake of the Snowden revelations.
The ﬁrst controversy concerns the deﬁnition of digital
data, and particularly the distinction between metadata
and content, which has been used repeatedly by security
professionals to justify bulk data collection. The second
controversy we discuss relates to mass surveillance and
the relationship between humans and machines in jus-
tifying surveillance practices. Here, a ‘computational
turn’ in surveillance is used by security professionals
as a reassurance that no privacy is invaded as only
computers look at bulk-collected data. A third justiﬁ-
cation that security professionals have promoted is that
they need to collect everything and make data big for
algorithms to develop anticipatory knowledge of the
‘next terrorist attack’. Contra these discourses of nov-
elty, we show how debates in computer and informa-
tion science can be mobilized to challenge the security
professionals’ claims to credible knowledge.
(Meta)data and the remaking of
security knowledge
Since the Snowden revelations, a new concept has
entered the public vocabulary: metadata. Long used by
archivists and computer experts, metadata has more
recently been at the heart of controversies about security
practices. President Obama argued that the NSA pro-
gramme was not gathering data but metadata, namely
how long a call was or where it was made from. He
reinforced that metadata collection would then be diﬀer-
ent from surveillance and proceeded to allay the public’s
fears: ‘Nobody is listening to your telephone calls. That’s
not what this program is about’ (Obama, 2013).
Metadata is therefore seen as not encroaching upon
rights or privacy, as it does not reach content. In the
UK, Theresa May has also claimed that privacy con-
cerns only come into eﬀect ‘at the point at which the
communication is opened’ (Wheeler, 2014). Metadata is
supposed to not convey information about what people
say or do in their homes. In that sense, metadata is
rendered as the opposite of the telephone tap and
the secret agent listening in for revealing clues. It is
also the opposite of the camera, the extended CCTV-
surveillance that appears to pry into the intimate and
intricate details of everyday life. The content/metadata
distinction therefore justiﬁes the practices of intelli-
gence agencies, as ultimately they are deemed to be
using a qualitatively diﬀerent form of data.
Yet, this benign reading of metadata has been chal-
lenged by critics, who have argued, on the one hand,
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that metadata is data about content and that the uses of
metadata were no more devoid of knowledge than data
is, on the other. For instance, Edward Snowden has
pointed out that ‘[m]etadata is what allows an actual
enumerated understanding, a precise record of all the
private activities in all of our lives’ (Plume, 2014). In an
Amici curiae brief for the ACLU v Clapper case in the
USA, ﬁled by a coalition of non-governmental organ-
izations (NGOs) in the wake of the Snowden revela-
tions, several computer scientists have emphasized the
sensitivity of metadata in similar terms and challenged
the hierarchy that President Obama and the intelligence
experts set in place. ‘The pool of telephony metadata
collected by the government’, they note, ‘reveals a
wealth of deeply personal and intimate information
about millions of Americans’ (Abelson et al., 2014).
These critics draw attention to the relationships
between (telephony) metadata, content, and informa-
tion. Networks of people can coalesce around certain
phone numbers of, for instance, their local sports
centre. Thus, telephony metadata oozes with mean-
ing, which makes its distinction from content
problematic.
Indeed, this distinction between metadata and con-
tent has been contested by critical scholars and civil lib-
erties activists alongside whistle-blowers and computer
scientists. However, we contend that there are limita-
tions to the critical arguments that metadata¼ data¼
knowledge. In information science, the ﬁeld of know-
ledge engineering covers the transformation of content
into data that computers can process. For knowledge
engineering, content is really anything that can be
expressed digitally like any video, software, text, or
audio. In our case, content is, for instance, a phone con-
versation. Knowledge engineering sets out to discover all
computer-actionable data in this content.
Communications (meta)data such as location and time
is an important part of this data. Computers prefer
(meta)data to content, as the former is structured
and semantically deﬁned for their processing. The dis-
tinction between content and (meta)data, which is
invoked and justiﬁed by the professionals of security
and politics, relies on an implicit hierarchy of knowledge
production that underlies the ﬁeld of knowledge engin-
eering. In computing and information science, this hier-
archy is generally referred to as data-information-
knowledge (DIK) and is widely discussed as one of the
foundational issues of these disciplines. The taxonomy
of data-information-knowledge starts with ‘raw’ data
and systematically builds information and ﬁnally
knowledge.
For the purposes of our argument, what counts is
the fact that professionals of security and politics rele-
gate (meta)data to the bottom of the supposed DIK
hierarchy. This has important implications, as it
might mean that the collection of data in all its forms
is regarded as irrelevant and ‘encourages the mindless
and meaningless collection of data in the hope that one
day it will ascend to information – pre-emptive acqui-
sition’ (Fricke´, 2009: 136). In this sense, the DIK hier-
archy enables Obama and others to claim that the bulk
collection of metadata is not politically signiﬁcant and
only becomes problematic once it has been transformed
into information and knowledge. Data becomes a raw
and neutral material ready to be mined.
As the hierarchy of DIK is translated into the polit-
ical realm, security professionals take up what is an
essentially messy distinction from computer and infor-
mation science and transform it into an absolute one in
order to justify knowledge production about ‘known
and unknown terrorists’. In a declassiﬁed opinion
from the US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(FISC) in the wake of the Snowden revelations, Judge
Claire Eagen noted that ‘it is necessary to obtain the
bulk collection of a telephone company’s metadata
to determine those connections between known
and unknown international terrorist operatives . . .’
(FISC, 2013: 18).
To avoid this move to the irrelevance of (meta)data,
computer and information scholars have challenged
the strict separation of categories and the DIK hier-
archy. This move is not quite the same as the recent
re-evaluation and claim by critical scholars that ‘there is
no such thing as raw data’ (Gitelman, 2013; Lyon,
2014) or that data is not simply ‘pre-analytical and
pre-semantic’ (Markham, 2013). Information scientists
have indeed long argued that the imagination of data as
‘discrete objects that can be located in time and space’
or as ‘raw numbers and facts’ (Alavi and Leidner,
2001: 109) is fundamentally ﬂawed. Ilkka Tuomi goes
furthest by stating that ‘data is more than knowledge’
(1999). Yet, they have also emphasized that data needs
to be understood in the context of more ﬂuid bound-
aries between data, information and knowledge (Alavi
and Leidner, 2001; Fricke´, 2009; Tuomi, 1999). In the
Amici curiae mentioned supra, computer scientists have
pointed out that:
Although the law may try to draw hard and fast dis-
tinctions between the two, see, e.g., Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979), the reality is far murkier
and typically depends on context. A change in technical
protocols or standards can cause information tradition-
ally regarded as metadata to be treated as content,
and vice-versa. But the task here is not to deﬁne ‘‘meta-
data,’’ nor do amici believe it practical or useful to do so
in a categorical way. (Abelson et al., 2014,
emphasis ours)
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While the interpretation of metadata as yielding infor-
mation about individuals has ultimately come to be
accepted by the US Court of Appeals of the Second
Circuit in its judgement in ACLU v Clapper, the
Court’s interpretation of metadata remains beholden
to a question of privacy (ACLU v Clapper, 2015: 10)
and does not take up the computer scientists’ argument
about the problematic boundaries between kinds
of data.
Data and metadata both refer to particular practices
of knowledge production in the context of the ﬁeld of
knowledge engineering, which simultaneously draw
boundaries (often through standards) between struc-
tured/unstructured data, information and knowledge.
These distinctions are compounded by political distinc-
tions between kinds of data and metadata. The UK
Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee
recent report on security and privacy recognises these
ﬂuid epistemic and political boundaries:
Metadata is a term commonly used in the USA, but it
has no legal deﬁnition in the RIPA and therefore no
bearing on the UK system of interception. For exam-
ple, in the UK a record of a website visited (e.g. http://
www.google.com) is treated as CD [communications
data], whereas the full web address, which
includes the precise words searched (e.g. http://www.
google.co.uk/search?q¼ISC), is treated as content.
(Intelligence and Security Committee, 2015: 52)
The critical move is not to ask for clarity and deﬁn-
itions more adapted to digital technologies, as many
NGOs and legal scholars suggest.2 It is also not suﬃ-
cient to subsume these to an overarching concept of
knowledge. Translating concepts of knowledge from
social science to this debate risks reproducing a similar
dis-counting of data. It also risks downplaying the pro-
cesses of (meta)data production. (Meta)data is not
simply a question of interpretation by analysts
(Bauman et al., 2014) or of data always being
‘cooked’. (Meta)data can simply be technical, like the
time and place of a particular phone call, and still be
meaningful.3
The turn to metadata in the emerging Big Data-
security assemblage needs to be understood in the con-
text of an economy of Big Data production where
‘digital sources create data as a by-product’ (Ruppert
et al., 2013) and we become ‘walking data generators’
(McAfee and Brynjolfsson, 2012). Data itself is a com-
plex epistemic object, and distinctions between kinds of
data are produced depending on how data is actionable
by digital devices. In another Amici curiae submitted by
the Electronic Frontier Foundation and ACLU in
another legal case, Klayman v Obama, we are reminded
that ‘structured data, including telephony metadata, is
ideally suited for computational analysis’ (EFF and
ACLU, 2014: 11). Thus, theories of (meta)data produc-
tion and the critique of the DIK hierarchy are import-
ant moves that challenge the justiﬁcatory discourses of
security professionals. At the same time, the problem-
atization of metadata in the emerging Big Data-security
assemblage needs to be supplemented by the under-
standing of how kinds of data are produced as action-
able by digital devices. It is structured data that is an
essential component in the work of Big Data organiza-
tions (Ekbia et al., 2015). A critique of NSA
and GCHQ surveillance practices entails taking ser-
iously the production of data as a heterogeneous epi-
stemic and political object. ‘Making up people’
(Hacking, 1999) needs to be supplemented today by
‘making up data’.
Seeing like a computer? Big Data
as artificial intelligence
A second argument in the controversies about digital
surveillance has been formulated in terms of controlled
entries to and views onto data. Critics have drawn
attention to the practices of ‘mass surveillance’ and
their eﬀects on human rights and democracy (Bauman
et al., 2014; De Hert and Gutwirth, 2006; Rouvroy and
Poullet, 2009). Security professionals have attempted to
justify these practices as non-intrusive by arguing that it
is computers that read data ﬁrst and foremost, while
humans only see little of what is otherwise processed by
machines. Justiﬁcatory discourses of ‘bulk data collec-
tion’ and targeted rather than mass surveillance have
hinged upon a distinction between humans and
machines, computers and analysts. In an op-ed for
the New York Times, Charles A Shanor, a professor
of law, asks:
shouldn’t I be concerned that F.B.I. agents are tram-
pling my rights, just like the I.R.S. might have trampled
the rights of certain organizations seeking tax-exempt
status? As it turns out, the answer is no. The raw ‘meta-
data’ requested will not be directly seen by any F.B.I.
agent. (2013)
He goes on to argue that it is in fact a computer that
sorts ‘through the millions of calls and isolates a very
small number for further scrutiny’ (Shanor, 2013) and
ﬁnds it a better option than the transparency advocated
by human rights activists. In the ACLU v Clapper case
mentioned earlier, Judge William Pauley III based his
decision to dismiss the case on similar arguments put
forth by Theresa Shea, Director of Signals Intelligence
Directorate at NSA, that ‘only a very small percentage
of the total data collected is ever reviewed by intelligence
analysts’ (2013). Shea explicates that ‘[a]lthough bulk
4 Big Data & Society
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metadata are consolidated and preserved by the NSA
pursuant to Section 215, the vast majority of that infor-
mation is never seen by any person’ (2013: 8, emphasis
ours).
Shea and other intelligence experts invoke an ana-
logy between NSA bulk data processing and targeted
surveillance. Ultimately, the assumption is that there is
no surveillance where data in not ‘seen’ by a human
being. The human/machine distinction, with humans
supposedly only coming in at the end of the data pro-
cessing, aims to render these practices of data collection
and processing legitimate by enacting a strong separ-
ation between humans and machines. These justiﬁca-
tions do not only deactivate criticisms about mass
surveillance, but are mobilized to disable claims
before the law. James R Clapper, the Director of US
National Intelligence, pursues this strategy to ask for a
dismissal in ACLU v Clapper: ‘those injuries could arise
only if metadata associated with plaintiﬀs’ calls were
actually reviewed by a person, and plaintiﬀs do not
dispute that only a small fraction of the Section 215
telephony metadata is actually reviewed by any
person’ (Clapper et al., 2014).
In the UK, the 2013 Annual Report of the
Interception of Communications Commissioner reiter-
ates this logic, where GCHQ data mining is deemed
legal given that ‘intrusion in this context into the priv-
acy of innocent persons would require sentient examin-
ation of individuals’ communications’ (May, 2014,
emphasis ours). In the UK Parliament’s recent public
inquiry on security and privacy, the reasoning follows
the same strong binary of human/machine, as the
report concludes that only ‘a tiny fraction’ of collected
data is ‘ever seen by human eyes’ (Intelligence and
Security Committee, 2015).
The justiﬁcation of the separation between humans
and computers is diﬃcult to sustain if we understand the
computing involved in terms of socio-technical assem-
blages, an unstable and contingent collection of hetero-
geneous elements (Latour, 2005). Yet, this distinction
has been much more resistant to critique than the meta-
data/data distinction. To push our critical vocabularies
further, it is not enough to point out that the Big Data-
security assemblage is socio-technical. We need to
understand not just human–non-human relationality,
but also ‘the content of the relationships that hold
assemblages in place’ (Allen, 2011: 156). What matters
in the Big Data-security assemblage is how the relation
between humans and computers gains content, and how
the assembling of humans and computers is both an
association and a division of labour.
Big Data organizations are characterized by a new
division of labour between humans and computers
(Blanke, 2014; Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2011) that is
about integrating human and machine reasoning at
each step of processing relevance and learning how to
distinguish signiﬁcant and non-signiﬁcant information
from each other. In this division of labour, humans and
machines are brought together in the same infrastruc-
tures to process the data. Recent advances in informa-
tion systems have focused on connections between
humans and computers, given a fundamental shift in
how these systems are designed as artiﬁcial intelligence
applications. A historical perspective on information
systems for artiﬁcial intelligence helps shed light on
this division of labour.
In social sciences, debates about automation,
robotics, and data-driven science also suggest a
change in human/non-human assemblages. Much crit-
ical work has focused on a shift towards computational
decision-making and has downplayed the division of
labour between humans and computers. We propose
a diﬀerent reading of human–computer assemblages
by revisiting historical debates and transformations in
the wake of the so-called ‘winter of artiﬁcial intelli-
gence’ (AI). The phrase captures the perceived failure
in the late 1980s of attempts to develop analytical capa-
cities that would bring computing machines close to
human intelligence. All the enthusiasm and the early
promises of creating the thinking machines seemed
gone. However, theoretical and practical breakthroughs
in artiﬁcial intelligence capacities have since put in doubt
this supposed ‘winter’ (Kurzweil, 2005: 264), as AI has
developed a new type of ‘intelligence’ by combining
human and computer reasoning.
In a reply to Noam Chomsky’s critique of artiﬁcial
intelligence, Peter Norvig (2012), Google’s Director of
Research, captures the epistemic transformation that
took place in the 1980s. The ‘winter of AI’ was related
to an over-reliance on logical models to simulate
human reasoning and their subsequent failure.
Computing scientists wanted to create an artiﬁcial
intelligence that replicated human intelligence, but
was separate from humans. Norvig (2012) locates
an epistemico-material transformation from logical
models to statistical models which ‘have achieved a
dominant (although not exclusive) position.’ Unlike
logical models, statistical models focus on assemblages
of humans and machines that can process data. Rather
than re-creating a black box that veils how humans
reason, artiﬁcial intelligence has focused on building
models that can solve particular problems. These
models are developed within complex workﬂows of
human–computer interaction, starting with large test-
beds to tune algorithms so that they simulate human
judgement on information relevance or expressed sen-
timents. In order to perform, algorithms need to be
constantly evaluated for their eﬀectiveness.
The epistemic crisis of AI has led to a reconﬁgur-
ation and integration of human work and intelligence
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into new human–computer assemblages. Information
systems to develop analytical capacities have thus
been built in a similar way since the winter of AI.
Security systems in all their components share with
other data science applications that they are also the
result of the winter of AI, when research and funding
shifted from ‘wild-eyed dreams’ of creating a human-
like machine and started to concentrate on particular
applications that were made possible by fostering dif-
ferent connections and division of labour between
humans and computers.
In these models, humans do not interact with the
data just at the end, but are involved at every stage
through evaluation, optimization, training, etc. Yet,
this does not mean that computers are simply passive
tools, because as much processing as possible needs to
be computerized. Computers should learn ‘unsuper-
vised’ or, to put it diﬀerently, develop agency in these
assemblages. A successful unsupervised learning tech-
nique is, for instance, the so-called topic modelling,
which auto-summarizes a collection of documents
into a number of common topics. In security applica-
tions, for instance, topic modelling is used to summar-
ize cyber-threats in web data mining. However, these
topic models can be too suggestive and require careful
intervention by humans (Schmidt, 2011). Even so-
called ‘unsupervised’ techniques are not black boxes
but a human–computer assemblage.
Similarly, since 2006 we have witnessed yet another
transformation in machine learning techniques through
‘deep learning’ for speech and image recognition.
Again, however, as soon as one analyses the compo-
nents of this new black box, it becomes apparent that
even deep learning as the state-of-the-art in unsuper-
vised computational learning requires human participa-
tion. Rather than becoming autonomous, computers
are still enrolled in a socio-technical assemblage. Two
leading machine-learning researchers, Socher and
Manning, thus deﬁne machine learning as the ‘numer-
ical optimization of weights for human-designed repre-
sentations and features’ (2013). Security analytics is no
diﬀerent from other domains that enrol computers,
artiﬁcial intelligence practices and data scientists.
In analysing this emerging assemblage through the
transformation of AI, we have built upon critical work
that draws attention to the socio-technical character of
Big Data (Lyon, 2014). Yet, our analysis also shows
how relations in a socio-technical assemblage gain con-
tent historically. Debates in AI have reconﬁgured the
human–computer assemblage through an epistemico-
material division of labour between humans and com-
puters. This re-reading of Big Data through the history
of AI also allows us to challenge the credibility of the
distinctions that security professionals attempt to insti-
tute between computer-based targeted surveillance and
mass surveillance by showing how the ‘winter of AI’
has led to particular modes of assembling computers,
techniques of machine learning and (data and security)
analysts.
Algorithmic security: Anticipation
and probabilities
A third and related site of controversy in the emerging
Big Data-security assemblage has focused on the epi-
stemic capabilities of algorithms. Intelligence experts
speak about these capacities as ﬁnding the ‘needle in
a haystack’ and the NSA’s General Alexander as ‘con-
necting the dots’. In an intervention before the US
Congress following the Snowden revelations, former
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director
Robert Mueller noted that ‘If you narrow [the scope
of surveillance], you narrow the dots and that might be
the dot that prevents the next Boston’ (Roberts, 2013).
The shift in reasoning towards the anticipation of pos-
sibilities, conjecture and speculation underpins the jus-
tiﬁcations that security professionals proﬀer for the
necessity of extensive Big Data mining. Critical security
and surveillance scholars have analysed the recalibra-
tion of security practices through anticipatory know-
ledge (Amoore, 2014; Aradau and van Munster, 2011;
Cooper, 2008; de Goede, 2012; Lyon, 2014). Critical
data studies have highlighted to the predictive fallacy
of Big Data, the tension between correlation and caus-
ation, the ‘return to empiricism’, and the opacity of
algorithms (Boyd and Crawford, 2012; Ekbia et al.,
2015, Kitchin, 2014; van Dijck, 2014).
As important as these criticisms are, they do not
address the perceived necessity to ‘collect it all’, the
whole ‘haystack’ of data, in order to enhance the cap-
abilities of algorithms. As Judge Pauley III glosses in
ACLU v Clapper, the bulk metadata collection pro-
gramme is ‘a wide net that could ﬁnd and isolate gos-
samer contacts among suspected terrorists in an ocean
of seemingly disconnected data’ (ACLU v Clapper,
2015). Security professionals talk about ‘needles in hay-
stacks’ and take the necessity of collecting and creating
an ever-larger ‘haystack’ of data for granted. Thus, the
fact that all the data is needed for the purposes of ter-
rorism prevention becomes unquestionable:
No doubt, the bulk telephony metadata collection pro-
gram vacuums up information about virtually every tele-
phone call to, from, or within the United States. That is
by design, as it allows the NSA to detect relationships so
attenuated and ephemeral they would otherwise escape
notice. (ACLU v Clapper, 2013: 52, emphasis ours)
These statements become meaningful through the
promise of algorithms to unveil the ‘unknown
6 Big Data & Society
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terrorists’ through the anomalous clues and features
that cannot be easily clustered and do not fall under
a normal pattern.4 Algorithms appear to institute the
new: new processes, rationalities, and techniques of
decision-making. Critical discussions about algorithms
and algorithmic reasoning have focused on the ‘ontol-
ogy of association’ (Amoore, 2011) and the secret
nature of the algorithms used by intelligence agencies
and businesses (Pasquale, 2015). We argue that critical
discourses need to engage more closely with algorithmic
practices. Here, we focus on two elements of algorith-
mic practices: the relation between data and algorithms,
and probabilistic methods.
Firstly, we take seriously Norvig’s widely quoted
claim that Google does not necessarily have better algo-
rithms than everybody else, but more data (quoted in
Schutt and O’Neil, 2013). Marissa Mayer, Google’s
former VP of Search Products and User Experience,
had also noted ‘that having access to large amounts
of data is in many instances more important than creat-
ing great algorithms’ (quoted in Perez, 2007). Data has
become more important than algorithms themselves,
because ‘[t]here is no single scientiﬁc breakthrough
behind Big Data. On the contrary, the methods used
have been well known and established for quite some
time’ (Lehikoinen and Koistinen, 2014: 39). Secondly,
we analyse algorithms through the probabilistic meth-
ods that all algorithms deploy independent of their
exact design in particular institutions. Discourses of
the ‘novelty’ of Big Data and algorithmic capacities
need to be located within probabilitistic methods and
their limitations, which are the foundation of Big Data
analytics as they allow reasoning about uncertainty
(Bengio et al., in preparation).
Justiﬁcatory discourses of the capabilities of Big
Data for security governance activate a particular
imagination of the relation between part and whole.
The haystack metaphor that security professionals are
using is no longer a metaphor for a sample size but for
Big Data, where ‘N¼ all’ (Mayer-Scho¨nberger and
Cukier, 2013). All data appears now to be needed or,
in a formula repeated by Big Data enthusiasts, data is
‘unreasonably eﬀective’ (Halevy et al., 2009). This not
only drives Big Data to become even bigger but it also
motivates engineers to trust probabilistic reasoning as a
way to render uncertainty mathematically (Fricke´,
2014: 3).
Shifting from the focus on algorithms to the data
that algorithms need and the modes of probabilistic
reasoning designed for algorithmic processes allows us
to develop a critical vocabulary about the ‘needle in a
haystack’. Security professionals have justiﬁed this need
for an inﬁnitely expanding haystack through the idea
that having all the data can algorithmically reveal
better knowledge about potential terrorists, which
would make pre-emptive action possible. However,
this imaginary of Big Data that yields better knowledge
has been challenged in debates about Big Data. Bigger
data is not better ‘without limit’ (Fricke´, 2014: 5).
Let us take an example, which has been at the heart
of claims about the unreasonable eﬀectiveness of data:
Google. Google engineers can rely on the ‘unreasonable
eﬀectiveness’ of web page data, because these pages
consist of words whose meaning can be derived from
the frequencies with which these words appear within
web pages. Over time, ‘human language has already
evolved words for the important concepts’ (Halevy
et al., 2009: 12). Security applications, on the other
hand, share with Big Data applications in humanities
and social sciences the interest in shifting concepts and
‘minority’ vocabularies, rare words and rare data.
While standard algorithmic reasoning can be ‘success-
ful for a lot of things’ that follow regularities, ‘it
amounts to a deliberate neglect of rare words’ (White,
2011). Statistical algorithms tend to ignore rare data,
especially as the models get more complex in social
domains and are tightly ﬁtted to their original training
data. In the language of machine learning for Big Data,
these models are ‘overﬁtted’ to the training data and are
challenged by new unknown data items. According to
the data scientist Janert (2010: 424), the ‘nature of stat-
istical learning’ requires us to add more and more
dimensions to our data and move further away from
the rare variables.
Another example of the fallacy to ‘collect it all’ for
the purposes of data analytics is the analysis by the
computer scientist and outspoken critic of NSA data
mining Edward Felten (2014), where he shows how in
typical data reasoning reduced data sets can lead to
better results than large data sets. He argues that if
the NSA covers larger numbers of phone connection
hops, starting from a phone number they have under
surveillance, this will not render the security analytics
more eﬀective. As Felten shows using typical algo-
rithms, the fewer the hops involved (i.e. the smaller
the sample), the better the results. The NSA drive to
collect and mine Big Data understood as ‘all data’ is
revealed as a myth.
The drive to collect more and more data is not just
based on a Big Data myth but can be counterproduct-
ive not just for the ﬁtting of the machine learning algo-
rithms but also for their methods, as it generally leads
to many false positives. Computer scientists involved in
mining Big Data have argued for a long time that the
larger the haystack, the more likely it is that only mean-
ingless events are added. A comparison of random and
non-random events will lead to an overestimation of
the non-random ones. One of the standard textbook
introductions to machine learning makes an important
point for our discussion (Leskovec et al., 2011). In
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oﬀering a standard example of predictive data analytics
for counter-terrorism, the authors develop a criticism of
the assumption that if the haystack is just big enough
and enough data is collected, the ocean of data will
automatically also increase the possibilities to ﬁnd the
needle in the data.
Starting with a typical data mining case for counter-
terrorism, Leskovec et al. (2011) work with the assump-
tion that two people are considered to be suspicious if
they stayed more than once in the same hotel at the
same time, which is a typical assumption in security
analytics. In their example, if one billion people were
to be tracked over a period of 1000 days, there will be a
well-deﬁned probability that two random people stay at
the same hotel more than once. This probability is quite
small and might therefore look promising for identify-
ing potential suspects. The problem is, however, that in
these millions of people there are many possible pairs of
people who could have stayed at the same hotel. In
their calculation, the result was over 250,000 of such
‘suspicious’ pairs (Leskovec et al., 2011). Therefore, as
computer scientists know, the error in data mining
methods actually rises if more and more data is col-
lected, which is contrary to the belief that an ‘ocean
of data’ makes it possible to identify ‘gossamer con-
tacts’ with more certainty.
The production of large numbers of false positives in
the ‘ocean of data’ raises another question for Big Data
mining – how to distinguish ‘real’ and ‘false’ suspects.
According to Felten (2014), rather than predicting new
terrorist activities, typical NSA security analytics algo-
rithms are designed for more realistic use cases in order
to avoid overﬁtting and overestimation of false posi-
tives. These algorithms are designed to substantiate
the suspicion a security analyst already has, rather
than predict new suspects or suspect behaviour, as the
analogy of the ‘needle in a haystack’ might suggest.
These algorithms are thus not good at eliminating sus-
picion. In general, they do not help to ﬁnd the needle in
the haystack but help conﬁrm whether there is reason
to assume that there might be a needle. Big Data
mining has never been good at evaluating false posi-
tives, which is less of an issue for an Internet search
engine where users get used to skipping irrelevant
results, but is an issue in a security context where inno-
cent people become suspicious.
Contra the FBI director Robert Mueller’s concern
that a narrower focus of surveillance will miss the dots
that need to be connected in order to prevent the ‘next
Boston’ (Roberts, 2013), computer scientists have
shown that it is often the wider focus that has this
eﬀect. If data grows big, both the apparent risk of a
terrorist attack and the number of suspicious people
will vastly increase. In terms of the theory of data
mining, this problem can be seen as typical of distribu-
tions with heavy tails, which are those distributions that
are extremely skewed with a long tail of events that
happen sometimes but not very often.
The ‘next terrorist attack’ is a possible event of low
probability such as the ‘rare words’ for which Google’s
data enthusiasm is less reasonably eﬀective, as dis-
cussed supra. Security-relevant activities are generally
heavy-tailed, as they are conducted by a small number
of people compared to the overall population. The cor-
responding heavy-tailed distributions require special
methods in order to apply algorithmic reasoning
(Clauset et al., 2007). General statistical assumptions
about what can be reasonably expected as the next
event do not work, because these are ‘distributions
without expectations’ (Janert, 2010: 201). The mean
event, for instance, does not reveal anything about
the expected behaviour of the distribution. For heavy-
tailed distributions, events outside the tail do not indi-
cate anything about events in the tail where the suspects
can be found. Similarly, the random behaviour of those
who are not suspicious does not tell us much about the
behaviour of suspects and vice versa. Making the data
‘big’ will therefore not reveal anything that can be used
to identify suspects, as long as we do not know whether
this data belongs to the tail.
In order for data mining to work on heavy-tailed
distributions, these are often split up into various sub-
groups where each of them is dealt with individually.
To make these divisions, cut-oﬀ points need to be
found that analysts consider as indicative of suspicious
behaviour in the tail. For instance, all those are sus-
pects who call the same phone number in Maryland.
These features generally cannot be just read from the
data, but an analyst needs to make a decision as to
which features count to identify a suspect (Janert,
2010: 434). Big Data algorithms require specialized the-
ories and domain assumptions like the feature that sus-
pects call the same number in Maryland. Formally
speaking, without assumptions about the data, Big
Data mining algorithms do not perform better on
new information than any random prediction; this is
independent of the size of the data set (Wolpert and
Macready, 1997).
The metaphor of ﬁnding the needle in the haystack is
a powerful one used by Big Data professionals and then
reused by security professionals, judges and politicians.
While it seemingly justiﬁes the huge eﬀort of collecting
more and more data in order to cover all possibilities,
the metaphor eﬀaces debates in computer science about
the epistemic limits of algorithmic practices and meth-
ods. Developing a critique of anticipatory algorithmic
security entails an immanent critique of algorithmic
practices and methods.
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Conclusion: Theses on critique
On 7 May 2015, the US Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit overturned the decision in ACLU v
Clapper that granted the government’s motion to dis-
miss and argued that the programme was unlawful
under §215 of the Patriot Act (2015). The decision
draws on the declaration by Edward Felten and other
Amici curiae information, which have disputed the gov-
ernment’s justiﬁcation of telephone (meta)data collec-
tion. While the Court does not address the challenge of
constitutionality, the decision highlights the importance
of computing knowledge to challenge the credibility of
claims made by security professionals. At the same
time, the judges have left a series of other assumptions
about surveillance by computers and the algorithmic
capabilities unquestioned.
In order to address the impasses of critique in public
and academic controversies, this paper has proposed a
series of reformulations of existing critical vocabularies
of the Big Data-security assemblage. A collaboration
between social sciences, and computer and information
sciences, as developed here, can challenge the credibility
of the justiﬁcations promoted by intelligence agencies
such as the NSA and the GCHQ and contribute to
research agendas in critical approaches to security
and surveillance, on the one hand, and critical data
studies, on the other. Rather than assuming that
informatics is ‘the discipline of choice of liberal
power’ (Bauman et al., 2014, 139), we have interpreted
a series of debates in knowledge engineering, artiﬁcial
intelligence and data mining in order to address the
limits and impasses of critical engagements with Big
Data in security governance. Methodologically, we
have been able to eschew the invocation of secrecy
around NSA and GCHQ practices by engaging with
the state-of-the-art in computer and information sci-
ences. As employers of computer scientists, mathemat-
icians, and physicists, we have contended that the NSA
and the GCHQ are unlikely to have developed technol-
ogies and methods beyond the latest research in aca-
demic and commercial organizations. Yet, despite the
apparent credibility of their discourses being grounded
in the scientiﬁcity of these disciplines, we have shown
that debates in computer and information science chal-
lenge this credibility. We have combined this engage-
ment with computer and information science with an
analysis of legal cases, public inquiries, parliamentary
and media reports, and declassiﬁed documents in the
wake of the Snowden revelations.
We have developed a two-pronged argument. On the
one hand, we have shown that the invocations of priv-
acy, mass surveillance and decisions by algorithms run
into political and epistemic impasses as they have been
continually challenged by professionals of security and
politics. On the other, we have argued for diﬀerent
vocabularies of critical intervention in the sites of con-
troversy in the emerging Big Data-security assemblage:
from metadata privacy to the production of data as a
complex epistemic entity; from mass surveillance by
computers to the division of labour between humans
and computers in artiﬁcial intelligence; from an under-
lying algorithmic logic of security to algorithmic prac-
tices and probabilistic methods. These interventions
suggest several trajectories for developing critical
research about data in security governance. By way of
conclusion we propose four theses on critique:
Thesis 1
Big Data theories and methods are not as new or revo-
lutionary as the justiﬁcatory discourses of security
professionals and many critical academic analyses of
Big Data suggest. Rather than assuming a ‘Big Data
revolution’, the deployment of Big Data for security
purposes needs to be understood in terms of what
Michel Foucault has called the ‘inﬂection of the
curve’ (1998 [1976]).
Thesis 2
Data is a complex epistemic object. Therefore, data
needs to be approached as an object of inquiry rather
than subsumed to knowledge. Meanings of data, meta-
data, and knowledge diﬀer between social sciences and
information science. Rather than simply contending
that there is no such thing as raw data, critical data
studies need to analyse the ‘making up’ of data and
the production of kinds of data at the juncture between
information and computer science, on the one hand,
and politics, on the other.
Thesis 3
The digital age does not mean that decisions are simply
transferred from humans to computers and algorithms.
We are only beginning to understand the transform-
ation of intelligence agencies (and other security organ-
izations) into Big Data organizations. There is little
existing work on the details of this organizational
change, which entails understanding histories of Big
Data as artiﬁcial intelligence, and particularly the
reconceptualization of the relation between humans
and computers in AI. Analyses of data-security assem-
blages need to attend not just to the modes of associ-
ation and heterogeneous elements of an assemblage,
but equally to how it gains content through a division
of labour between humans and computers.
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Thesis 4
There are no ‘unreasonably eﬀective’ algorithms.
Critical approaches to security and surveillance need
to engage with the methods and routine practices of
Big Data-security analytics. Algorithms continue to
rely on probabilistic methods, which depend on and
are challenged by the increased amounts of data pro-
duced today. Unless we analyse the algorithmic prac-
tices and methods from information and computing
sciences, we might write and critique only the science
ﬁction of security analytics.
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Notes
1. For critical engagements, which challenge the relevance of
liberal concepts of privacy and human rights for the digital
age, see for instance Finn Brunton and Nissenbaum
(2011).
2. See the International Principles on the Application of
Human Rights to Communications Surveillance, a global
consultation on a framework to evaluate digital surveil-
lance practices (https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/
text).
3. Although for reasons of space we cannot discuss the vari-
ous kinds of metadata, we should mention here that in
information science there is a distinction between admin-
istrative and technical metadata as well as descriptive
metadata. The latter are, for instance, keywords that
describe the content of a phone call, while the former
are, e.g., timestamps of phone calls. All these types of
metadata are used in surveillance and the boundaries
between them are fluid (Miller, 2011). Especially technical
metadata such as timestamps is easily structured data in
the processing pipelines of knowledge engineering.
4. The lack of evidence of a high number of thwarted terror-
ist plots by the NSA and the GCHQ did not undermine the
argument that having the whole haystack could potentially
predict the ‘next terrorist attack’.
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